What is this about?

The discussion is centered on transitioning Rocket Pool to an on-chain pDAO model to decentralize the current pDAO governance system. The aim is to remove the team as an executive middleman, which could lead to increased gas costs and added complexity. The community is evaluating various aspects of the model, such as voting power calculations, gas costs, security features, and the clarity of the RPIP wording. A draft RPIP has been posted, and a formal vote is expected. The conversation also touches on the impact of RPL collateral on voting power and the idea of removing the maximum RPL collateral limit to simplify the process and align voting power with reward distribution.

How is the community reacting?

The community's response is a mix of support and concerns. Wander supports the design but suggests additional security features. Darkmessage and Umeku are concerned about the clarity of the RPIP wording and the specifics of the proposal execution process. LongForWisdom points out the absence of a proper time-lock mechanism. Valdorff and Knoshua discuss proposal criteria improvements and the role of delegations. Epineph and Langers advocate for removing the maximum RPL collateral limit, with Langers emphasizing the benefits of the pDAO replacement, such as its future-proof nature and the optimistic proving scheme²⁶. RPIP-33 has been moved to Review, and Langers has called for any last community feedback before finalization²⁷. Valdorff noted a typo in the documentation and raised concerns about a weak guardrail on rpl.inflation.interval.rate²⁸. Kane clarified the security.proposal.execute.time parameter and agreed to update the RPIP to remove ambiguity²⁹. Langers confirmed that Kane has raised a PR to correct the typo and update RPIP-33, including replacing vote time parameters with two-phase ones and updating the technical information link³⁰. Valdorff discusses the impact of setting a parameter to 1e15, which would allow a single step to result in a 51% change, suggesting that even 1e14 would allow for a significant 4% change per vote. They express that while they are comfortable with the parameter being set to 1e16, it should be subject to discussion and review, especially since it could be off by several orders of magnitude, which could lead to various issues if proposals are not properly reviewed³¹.

Why this is positive?

• The on-chain pDAO model aims to enhance Rocket Pool's governance by increasing decentralization.
• Strong community engagement is leading to suggestions for improvements and addressing security concerns.
• The draft RPIP and discussions are resulting in clarifications and enhancements, such as a mechanism to overrule a delegate's vote.
• The pDAO replacement is seen as future-proof and flexible due to the optimistic proving scheme.

Why this is negative?

• There are concerns about increased gas costs for voting and transactions with the new system.
• Worries persist about vote manipulation and the need for additional security features.
• The lack of a proper time-lock mechanism could pose risks with malicious proposals.
• The complexity of the system and the clarity of the RPIP wording remain as concerns.
• Valdorff's concerns about the rpl.inflation.interval.rate parameter suggest that incorrect settings could lead to significant governance issues³¹.

Next actions

• A final sentiment poll for RPIP-33 regarding the implementation of an On-Chain pDAO is in progress, moving towards a vote.
• Kane plans to submit a PR to update the RPIP with a detailed document on the implementation.
• The proposal to remove the maximum RPL collateral limit, as suggested by Epineph, will be subject to a DAO vote.
• Kane has raised a PR to correct a typo in the documentation and to update RPIP-33 with changes including two-phase vote time parameters and clarification of the security.proposal.execute.time parameter³⁰.
• The community is encouraged to discuss and review the rpl.inflation.interval.rate parameter setting, as highlighted by Valdorff³¹.