What is this about?

The discussion revolves around the proposed social mitigation strategy for Miner Extractable Value (MEV) on the dYdX v4 platform. The strategy includes the formation of a MEV Slashing Committee, which would monitor and analyze on-chain behavior for MEV activities using Skip's dashboard. The committee would consist of 7 members with a 6-month term and a budget of $84,000. Their responsibilities encompass reviewing MEV activity, recommending community actions, and creating a standardized framework for retroactive measures. The community would have the final say on any committee recommendations. The committee aims to deter malicious MEV activities and provide a structured response to incidents.

How is the community reacting?

Community reactions are mixed. Some members support the idea of a dedicated committee to tackle MEV issues, citing the need for informed recommendations and accountability. Concerns have been raised about the committee's size, potential conflicts of interest, particularly with Reverie's involvement, and the immediate impact on v4. Questions about the necessity and size of the committee's budget have been brought up, with suggestions that a smaller team or validators could handle the responsibilities. There are also calls for committee members to have "skin in the game" to prevent collusion and bribery. The community is discussing the potential conflicts of interest between trustees and grantees and is awaiting a template for the slashing proposal and a standardized governance process.

Why this is positive?

• The committee aims to deter malicious actors and protect honest validators from wrongful penalties.
• It offers a proactive approach to MEV mitigation, potentially giving dYdX a competitive advantage.
• The committee's work to standardize responses to MEV incidents will be based on objective, data-driven criteria.
• Involving third-party experts who are not validators could ensure a balanced perspective and oversight.

Why this is negative?

• There are concerns about false positives affecting honest validators.
• The committee's effectiveness depends on data from Skip, raising questions about the diversity of data sources.
• The extent of the MEV problem on the testnet and the economic incentives for validators are not fully understood.
• Potential conflicts of interest, especially with Reverie's role in the committee, are concerning.
• Skepticism exists regarding the tangible outcomes and deliverables from the committee after their term.

Next actions

• The community is expected to vote on the implementation of social slashing based on set guidelines and the formation of a compensated committee to oversee this process.
• A discussion on potential conflicts of interest between trustees and grantees has been suggested.
• The community awaits a template for the slashing proposal and a standardized governance process.
• Reverie³⁷ has indicated a move forward with the mitigation strategy and committee appointments, emphasizing the need to monitor for malicious MEV behavior.
• Rob Tiong from Rated Network joins as the seventh committee member, bringing data analysis skills and validator experience.
• An on-chain proposal has been presented to establish a social strategy against MEV on dYdX v4, which, if successful, would lead to the Grants program funding the committee members.
• Tane³⁸ supports the committee's mandate to develop a framework based on discrepancy data and looks forward to future reports and recommendations.
• RealVovochka questions the accuracy of the "Skip dashboard" after its approval by the committee, noting the significant trading volume³⁹.