What is this about?

The discussion revolves around a new proposal for an Experimental Incentive System for active ArbitrumDAO delegates. The system is designed to increase participation and involvement in governance by providing incentives to delegates based on their activities and contributions. The proposal includes a three-tiered delegate selection process, a scoring system with various weighted parameters, and a bonus point system for significant contributions. A total of 30 delegates would be selected to receive incentives from a funding pool of 1,080,000 ARB over a six-month trial period. Delegates are required to confirm their participation and report their activities, with payments made in ARB tokens. The proposal also suggests a multisig configuration for fund management and the use of the Karma delegation dashboard to track delegate activities.

How is the community reacting?

The community has provided mixed feedback on the proposal. Some members, like Mmurthy and Bob-Rossi, have shown support for the initiative, emphasizing the importance of incentivizing active and effective delegates. Others, such as Maxlomu and Patrick_J, have raised concerns about the potential for the system to favor quantity over quality, the risk of collusion, and the complexity of the proposed tier system. They have suggested modifications to the framework, including baseline compensation for all active delegates, rewards for specialized expertise, and a more objective criteria for rewards. Cattin has responded to the feedback by proposing adjustments to the framework and considering an increase in the number of selected delegates.

Why this is positive?

• The incentive system aims to increase active participation and governance involvement.
• A structured framework with weighted parameters encourages delegates to engage in various beneficial activities.
• The bonus point system rewards significant contributions to the DAO.
• The use of a multisig configuration and the Karma dashboard enhances security and administrative efficiency.
• The proposal is experimental and open to adjustments based on its effectiveness and community feedback.

Why this is negative?

• The tier system may not respect the will of Arbitrum delegators and could be susceptible to gaming.
• There is a potential for collusion, where incentives might lead to a decline in proposal quality.
• The proposal may favor delegates who can dedicate more time ("horizontal quantity") over those with specialized expertise ("vertical quality").
• The scoring system's subjectivity could lead to disagreements and potential conflicts of interest.
• Concerns about the accuracy and effectiveness of the Karma dashboard were initially raised but later addressed.

Next actions

• The community will provide further feedback on the proposal.
• A vote on the scoring option will be conducted.
• Multisig signatories need to be found, and the program administrator needs to be defined.
• Changes will be published in Snapshot for community endorsement.
• SEEDLatam will monitor Karma's performance and collect community feedback.
• The proposal may proceed to a Snapshot vote, as suggested by Bob-Rossi.