[TEMP CHECK] Raising the Safety Module’s Slashing Percentage

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XenophonLabs proposed increasing Aave's Safety Module slashing percentage and lowering emissions, aiming to boost capital efficiency and save millions annually. The proposal sparked mixed reactions due to potential risks and impacts on the ecosystem, with suggestions for different approaches and ongoing discussions about the best way forward.

The discussion primarily revolved around a proposal by XenophonLabs to increase the slashing percentage on Aave's Safety Module from 30% to 60% or potentially up to 100%, and to lower emissions by 80 AAVE/day. The aim of this proposal was to increase capital efficiency and save Aave millions of dollars per year. However, the proposal was met with mixed reactions from the community. Some members, such as A_J and Figue, expressed concerns about the increased risk leading to stakers withdrawing and seeking safer yield opportunities, potentially negatively impacting the ecosystem. Others, like Tncintra, argued that the risk premium of the safety module is composed of several components, not just the slashing risk, and suggested that doubling the slashing percentage would not necessarily double the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) as stakers manage their risk tolerance.

The proposal was delayed due to intersecting with an existing snapshot and to avoid confusion in the DAO. XenophonLabs sought feedback from the community on the best way to structure the proposal. Other members, such as Dydymoon, suggested different approaches, like increasing the slashing percentage to 45% for volatile LPs and 60% for stable LPs, arguing that this would allow for a more accurate analysis of depositor (in)elasticity. They also proposed using the 80/20 Aave-wstETH as a case study due to its proposed slashing increase from 30% to 45%.

The discussion also touched on the implications of the proposal on GHO and its growth, and the potential for the Safety Module (SM) to go to zero if the slash rate goes to 100% or all incentives are cancelled. Tncintra responded to these concerns, acknowledging some points of agreement, such as not slashing stkAAVE before other staked pools and the value of diversifying the safety module. However, they disagreed with Dydymoon's interpretation of their analysis, stating that they did not assume stakers would stay despite increased risks and lowered rewards.

In conclusion, the discussion highlighted differing views on the proposal's impact on TVL, stakers' behavior, and the Aave token's risk. The community is still seeking a consensus on the best way forward.

Posted 4 months ago

Last reply 2 months ago

Summary updated 2 months ago

Last updated 03/12 08:00